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Abstract
Statistical Methods in Cryptography
by
Wei Dai
Cryptographic assumptions and security goals are fundamentally distributional.
As a result, statistical techniques are ubiquitous in cryptographic constructions and
proofs. In this thesis, we build upon existing techniques and seek to improve both
theoretical and practical constructions in three fundamental primitives in cryptogra-
phy: blockciphers, hash functions, and encryption schemes. First, we present a tighter
hybrid argument via collision probability that is more general than previously known,
allowing applications to blockciphers. We then use our result to improve the bound of
the Swap-or-Not cipher. We also develop a new blockcipher composition theorem that
is both class and security amplifying. Second, we prove a variant of Leftover Hash
Lemma for joint leakage, inspired by the Universal Computational Extractor (UCE)
assumption. We then apply this technique to construct various standard-model UCE-
secure hash functions. Third, we survey existing “lossy primitives” in cryptography,
in particular Lossy Trapdoor Functions (LTDF) and Lossy Encryptions (LE); we pro-
pose a generalized primitive called Lossy Deterministic Encryption (LDE). We show
that LDE is equivalent to LTDFs. This is in contrast with the block-box separation of
trapdoor functions and public-key encryption schemes in the computational case. One
common theme in our methods is the focus on statistical techniques. Another theme
is that the results obtained are in contrast with their computational counterparts—the
corresponding computational results are implausible or are know to be false.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Modern cryptography is almost exclusively based on computational assumptions.
The notions such as computational indistinguishablity, one-way functions, pseudo-
random generators and pseudorandom functions are of fundamental importance. Cou-
pled with the computational assumptions, cryptographic proofs and constructions
often utilize numerous other techniques. Since the cryptographic assumptions and
security goals are fundamentally distributional, statistical techniques is ubiquitous.
In this thesis, we build upon existing techniques and constructions in three different
topics: blockciphers, hash functions, and encryption schemes. One common theme in
our methods is the focus on statistical techniques. Another theme is that the results
obtained are in contrast with their computational counterparts—the corresponding
computational results are implausible or are know to be false.
1.1 Hybrid Argument
The hybrid argument, which is essentially the triangle inequality, is arguably the
most fundamental tool in security proofs. When bounding the difference in behavior
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of randomized algorithms with {0, 1} output, G0, from G1, one can define an interme-
diate system Gh. The triangle inequality tells us that
|Pr [G0 ⇒ 1]− Pr [G1 ⇒ 1]| ≤ |Pr [G0 ⇒ 1]− Pr [Gh ⇒ 1]|+ |Pr [Gh ⇒ 1]− Pr [G1 ⇒ 1]| .
In the statistical case, the statistical distance SD, which we will define formally later,
also satisfy the triangle inequality. For X, Y, Z distributions over the same sample
space, we have
SD(X, Z) ≤ SD(X, Y) + SD(Y, Z).
Applying this multiple times, one can bound SD(X1, Xn) by bounding SD(Xi, Xi+1)
for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1. In particular, if SD(Xi, Xi+1) ≤ ei for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1, then
SD(X1, Xn) ≤ ∑i ei. However, in many applications, the individual bounds of ei are
obtained from CP(Xi | X<i) ≤ 1+e2M , where M is the support size of Xi. We show that,
with this assumption, a tighter bound can be obtained.
SD(X1, Xn) ≤
√
∑
i
e2i .
As application of this result, we prove a tighter bound of the Swap-or-Not con-
struction.
1.2 Blockcipher Composition Theorems
Blockciphers are fundamental primitives in practical cryptography. It is the build-
ing block of symmetrical cryptography. The security game of a blockcipher is, essen-
tially, an interaction of an adversary with the blockcipher. The adversary has access to
the blockcipher as a oracle to query values of the cipher at different input points. At
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the end, the adversary should output a bit. The advantage of the adversary against
the blockcipher is the difference in the adversary’s behavior between interacting with
the blockcipher and interacting with a truly randomly sampled permutation.
Adaptive versus Non-Adaptive Security For the bounds to have practical crypto-
graphic importance, we usually want to prove adaptive security. That is to say, the
adversary can query the blockcipher depending on the answers it has received. How-
ever, non-adaptive security is usually easier to prove. The reason is that, often times,
proving non-adaptive security of a blockcipher is similar to bounding the convergence
time of a Markov chain. Currently, we do not have techniques to deal with adaptivity
directly. Instead, the final security claim is reach by way of a composition theorem.
The “two weak make one strong” theorem, proved in [MPR07], states that the com-
position two non-adaptively secure blockcipher is adaptively secure with roughly the
same parameters (the formal statement is given in Chapter 3). However, for practical
bounds, this means that one has to double the number of rounds to achieve adaptive
security.
In Chapter 3, we define the notion of chi-square distance. We show that, using
this new notion of distance, we get both distinguisher-class amplification and security
amplification. In particular, under the new definition of security, the composition of
two non-adaptively e-secure blockciphers is a adaptively e2-secure blockcipher.
However, we note the potential difficulties in bounding the chi-square distance to
the Swap-or-Not construction, and we leave it as an open problem.
3
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1.3 Leftover Hash Lemma for Joint Leakage
The Leftover Hash Lemma [HILL99] has seen wide-usage in cryptography, such
as for key derivation and deterministic encryption. Roughly, it states that if a random
variable X has enough “entropy”, then
(S, hS(X)) ≈ (S, U),
where h is a universal hash function, S is a uniform random seed, and U is a uni-
form element in the range of h. The average case variant of Leftover Hash Lemma
[DORS08], states essentially the same result with the present of leakage. In particular,
if X has enough entropy given leakage L(X), then
(S, L(X), hS(X)) ≈ (S, L(X), U).
UCEs The Universal Composition Extractor (UCE) assumption is an assumption of
hash functions [BHK13]. It was designed to instantiate hash functions in random ora-
cle model in the standard model [BHK13]. UCE is a parameterized assumption based
on the type of UCE source involved. A UCE source, SHash, makes queries to the ora-
cle, Hash, and produces leakage L. In this work, we focus on statistically unpredictable
sources, that is the queries of L should have high (ω(log(λ))) min-entropy given the
leakage L. Another classification of sources is a split source, S = splt[S0,S1]. Roughly
speaking, the leakage of
Joint Leakage and Construction of UCEs Following the Universal Computational
Extractor assumption [BHK13], we look at the case where the leakage function L takes
both the source X and the output hS(X) or U. More concretely, given that X has
4
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enough entropy given L(X, U), we ask if
(S, L(X, hS(X)))
?≈ (S, L(X, U)).
We prove a variant of Leftover Hash Lemma for the case of joint leakage. We obtain
UCE-secure hash function for slightly increasing number of query and constant output
length. With help of the recent Extremely Lossy Function (ELF) assumption [Zha16],
we show how to get O(λ) output length (and hence poly output length) with the same
query regime.
1.4 Unified Lossy Primitive: Lossy Deterministic Encryp-
tion
Lossy trapdoor functions (LTDF) was first proposed by Peikert and Waters [PW11].
In their work, concrete instantiations of LTDF was achieved under decisional Diffie-
Hellman (DDH) and learning-with-error (LWE) assumptions. Roughly speaking, a
LTDF is a family of efficiently computable functions that can be sampled in two modes:
injective mode and lossy mode. In injective mode, the function is a regular trapdoor
function. That is, one can invert the function using a trapdoor. In the lossy mode,
the function is compressing, meaning that the image size is smaller than the domain
size. The security of LTDFs states that the two modes should be computationally in-
distinguishable. Peikert and Waters used the abstraction of LTDFs to build the first
CCA encryption scheme based on lattice assumptions. Following their seminal work,
LTDFs have helped realize multiple security goals in the standard model, including
lossy encryption, deterministic encryption, and hedged encryption.
Lossy encryption was first proposed by [PVW08] to construct oblivious transfer
5
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(OT) protocols. In simple terms, lossy encryption has two modes, injective and lossy
mode. In injective mode, it should act as a correct encryption scheme. In the lossy
mode, encryption of any two messages should be statistically close (under the encryp-
tion randomness). As with LTDFs, the security of lossy encryption says that the two
modes should be computationally indistinguishable. The first construction of lossy
encryption was realized using DDH and LWE. Follow-up works [BBN+09, BHY09]
utilize LTDFs as an abstraction to build lossy encryption.
Deterministic encryption and hedged encryption is motivated by randomness sub-
version in public-key encryption. Deterministic encryption offers security when the
encrypted messages has enough entropy (requiring the messages to be either a block-
source [BFOR08] or a q-block-source [FOR15]). Hedged encryption [BBN+09] offers
standard IND-CPA when the encryption randomness is ideal. When the encryption
randomness is compromised, it offers security when the message and randomness
jointly offers contains entropy.
In Chapter 5, we put forth a unified security definition of lossy Deterministic En-
cryption (LDE) and construct secure LDE using LTDF in a modular way. In short, LDE
requires statistical closeness for high-entropy messages in the lossy mode. We show
that such assumption is, in some sense, equivalent to LTDFs.
Theorem (Informal). Any Lossy Deterministic Encryption Scheme is also a Lossy Trapdoor
Function.
6
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Preliminaries
We use log to denote the base-2 logarithm. Given a positive integer n, we define
[n] = {1, ...., n}, and use uppercase letters to denote the exponential base 2 of the
lowercase letters (for example, N = 2n). Let Ω be a finite sample space, we identify
a distribution, X, over Ω with its probability mass function PX : Ω → [0, 1]1. For a
distribution or random variable X, we use calligraphic letter, X , to denote the support.
For notational convenience, we also write |X| as the size of the support of X. We use
‖PX‖α := (∑ω∈Ω PX(ω)α)1/α, for α ≥ 1, to denote the α-norm of the pmf, PX. We use
(X, Y) to denote the joint probability distribution of X and Y. For a set S, we let US
denote the uniform distribution on S, and we use Un to denote U{0,1}n , the uniform
n-bit strings.
Cryptographic convention We often specify a distribution by how it is sampled. For
instance,
{(x, z) : x $← {0, 1}n, z = x},
1Notice that since we are working with a finite sample space, a distribution is uniquely determined
given a probability mass function, and vice versa.
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denotes a pair of n-bit strings, that is equal and both marginally uniform.
Security parameter We use λ as the security parameter. All randomized algorithm
is assumed to take 1λ as an implicit input. All parameters will be functions of λ. If
“polynomial” or “negligibility” of a parameter is mentioned, it will be with respect to
the security parameter λ. We use poly to denote the class of polynomials in λ, and const
to denote some constant function of λ. For a function of λ, f (λ), we will sometimes
suppress writing the security parameter λ and just write f .
2.1 Statistical Definitions
Definition 1. The statistical distance of two distributions over Ω, X, Y, is defined to be,
SD(X, Y) :=
1
2 ∑
ω∈Ω
|PX(ω)− PY(ω)|.
If SD(X, Y) ≤ e, we also write
X ≈s,e Y.
2.1.1 Entropy
There are three notions of entropy that is of interest: Shannon entropy, minimum
entropy and collision entropy. Here, we adopt the unified definition of Re´nyi Entropy
[R+61] and a conditional variant [FB14].
Definition 2 (Re´nyi Entropy [R+61]). Let X be a distribution, for α > 1, the Re´nyi entropy
of X is defined to be
Hα(X) :=
α
1− α log ‖PX‖α.
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We also define H∞(X) to be the limit of Hα(X) as α → ∞, and H1(X) to be the limit of
Hα(X) as α→ 1.
Remark. Let X be a distribution over Ω. We have that
H∞(X) = − log(max
ω∈Ω
PX(ω)),
H1(X) = − ∑
ω∈Ω
PX(ω) log PX(ω).
Definition 3 (Conditional Re´nyi Entropy [FB14]). Let α > 1, we define
Hα(X | Y) := − logRenα(X | Y),
where
Renα(X | Y) := EY[‖PX|Y=y‖α]
α
α−1 .
Lemma 1 ([FB14]). Let X, Y be jointly distributed and 1 < α < β. Then,
log(|X|) ≥ Hα(X | Y) ≥ Hβ(X | Y) ≥ 0.
Additionally, we define two natural notions, collision probability and prediction prob-
ability.
Definition 4.
CP(X) := EX[PX(X)],
Pred(X) := max
x∈X
PX(x).
The average case are simply the expectation over the conditioned variable.
CP(X | Y) := EY[CP(X | Y = y)],
9
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Pred(X | Y) := EY[Pred(X | Y = y)].
Lemma 2 (Jensen’s Inequality). Let X be a discrete real-valued random variable. Let f be a
convex function. Then,
f (E[X]) ≤ E[ f (X)].
A direct corollary of Jensen’s inequality relates Re´nyi probability of second order
and the conditional collision probability.
Corollary 1.
Ren2(X | Y) ≤ CP(X | Y).
Proof. We first rewrite both sides.
Ren2(X | Y) = EY[‖PX|Y=y‖2]2,
CP(X | Y) = EY[‖PX|Y=y‖22].
The result now follows from the convexity of squaring.
Another useful notion is Re´nyi divergence.
Definition 5. Let 1 < α. The Re´nyi divergence of order α is defined to be,
Dα(X‖Y) := 1
α− 1 log(∑ω
PX(ω)αPY(ω)1−α).
Additionally,
D1(X‖Y) = lim
α→1
Dα(X‖Y),
D∞(X‖Y) = lim
α→∞ Dα(X‖Y).
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D1 is also known as the Kullbach-Leibler (KL) divergence. For notational convenience, we use
RD as the exponentiated Re´nyi divergence.
RDα(X‖Y) = 2Dα(X‖Y).
Proposition 1.
D1(X‖Y) = EX[log(PXPY )].
D∞(X‖Y) = log(sup
ω
PX
PY
).
Proposition 2. Let X be a distribution on X . Then,
Hα(X) + Dα(X‖UX ) = log |X |.
Lemma 3 (Pinsker’s Inequality).
SD(X, Y) ≤
√
ln(2)
2
D1(X‖Y).
Lemma 4 (Second Order Pinsker’s Inequality [GS02]).
SD(X, Y) ≤ 1
2
√
RD2(X‖Y)− 1.
Lemma 5 (Leakage Chain Rule for Re´nyi Entropy [FB14]). The leakage chain rule states
that, conditioning on a random variable Z, the Re´nyi entropy only decreases by at most
log(|Z|), i.e.
Hα(X | Y, Z) ≥ Hα(X | Y)− log(|Z|).
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Proposition 3.
RD2((X, Z)‖(Y, Z)) = EZ[RD2(X | Z = z‖Y | Z = z)]
Proof. We derive that
RD2((X, Z)‖(Y, Z)) = ∑
(x,z)∈Ω
P(X,Z)(x, z)2
P(Y,Z)(x, z)
= ∑
(x,z)∈Ω
PZ(z)2PX|Z=z(x)2
PZ(z)PY|Z=z(x)
=∑
z
PZ(z)∑
x
PX|Z=z(x)2
PY|Z=z(x)
= EZ[RD2(X | Z = z‖Y | Z = z)].
2.1.2 Universal Hash Functions and q-Wise Independent Hash Func-
tions
Definition 6. A collection of functions
H = {Hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m | s ∈ {0, 1}d}
is universal, if for H $← H, and two distinct input x 6= y,
Pr [H(x) = H(y)] =
1
M
=
1
2m
.
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Definition 7. A collection of functions
H = {Hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m | s ∈ {0, 1}d}
is q-wise independent, if for H $← H, and q pairwise distinct inputs x1, . . . , xq, the outputs,
H(x1), . . . , H(xq), are independent as random variables and marginally uniform.
2.2 A Generalized Leftover Hash Lemma via Re´nyi Di-
vergence
We present a generalized version of Leftover Hash Lemma [HILL99] that general-
izes the following variants studies in literature: crooked [DS05, FOR15], average case
[DORS08], and multiple-input Leftover Hash Lemma [FOR15].
Flat sources A distribution X such that H∞(X) ≥ k is called a k-source. A flat k-
source is a distribution whose probability mass function is constant on any non-zero
inputs. A well-known fact is that any k-source is a convex combination of flat k-sources
[V+].
We prove an analogous fact for (conditionally) simple sources, which we will de-
fine below. The motivation is to be able to study (conditional) q-wise k-sources, which
are jointly distributions of the form X = (X1, . . . , Xq) ((X, Z) = ((X1, . . . , Xq), Z))
such that the component wise (conditional) entropy is at least k, i.e. H∞(Xi) ≥ k
(H∞(Xi | Z) ≥ k). Such sources directly corresponds to statistically unpredictable
UCE sources which we will study in Chapter 4.
Definition 8 ((Conditionally) Simple sources). A q-wise k-source, X = (X1, . . . , Xq), is
simple if there exists injective functions, f2, . . . , fq, such that X = (X1, f2(X1) . . . , fq(X1)).
13
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We say that a conditional q-wise k-source, (X, Z), is conditionally simple if for all z, X | Z = z
is simple.
Lemma 6. A (conditional) q-wise k-source is a convex combination of (conditionally) simple
q-wise k-sources.
Proof. We first prove the unconditional version. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xq) be a q-wise k-
source. Without loss of generality, we can assume that |supp(Xi)| = 2k. The proof is
by induction on q. Base case, let q = 2; we show that (X1, X2) is a convex combination
of simple k-sources. We identify the support of X1 and X2 with integers in [2k]. Con-
sider the matrix A = (ai,j = Pr [(X1, X2) = (i, j)]). Notice the constraints of being a flat
2-wise k-source says that ∑i ai,j = 2−k for all i and ∑j ai,j = 2−k for all j. Furthermore,
∑i,j ai,j = 1. We note that 2k A is doubly stochastic. Hence, 2k A is a convex combina-
tion of permutation matrices of size 2k. Notice that permutation matrix of size 2k by
2k, say (pij), corresponds to an injective function f : supp(X1) → supp(X2), where
f (i) = j iff pij = 1. Hence, (X1, X2) is a convex combination of simple sources of the
form (X1, f (X1)). We proceed by means of induction. Observe that if (X1, . . . , Xi) is
simple, an injective function f : supp(X1, . . . , Xi)→ supp(Xi+1) corresponds to some
injective f ′ : supp(X1) → supp(Xi+1). As the inductive step, we suppose that X =
(X1, . . . , Xi+1) is a q-wise flat k-source. We know that (X1, . . . , Xi) is a convex combi-
nation of simple sources. For each of this simple source, say (X′1, f2(X1)
′, . . . , fi(X′i)),
we apply the argument in base case to the distribution (X′1, X
′
i+1), specified by,
Pr
[
(X′1, X
′
i+1) = (x1, xi+1)
]
=
Pr
[
X′1 = x1
] · Pr [Xi+1 = xi+1 | X1 = x1, X2 = f2(x1), . . . , Xi = fi(x1)] .
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Preliminaries Chapter 2
Note that if
(X1, . . . , Xi) = ∑
f2,..., fi
c f2,..., fi(X
′
1, f2(X
′
1), . . . , fi(X
′
1)),
then
(X1, . . . , Xi, Xi+1) = ∑
f2,..., fi
c f2,..., fi(X
′
1, f2(X
′
1), . . . , fi(X
′
1), X
′
i+1).
Hence, since (X′i , X
′
i+1) is a convex combination of simple ones, so is (X1, . . . , Xi+1).
This concludes the proof for the unconditional case. The conditional case follows from
the fact that the joint distribution is a convex combination of marginal ones,
(X, Z) =∑
z
Pr [Z = z] (X | Z = z, z).
Each X | Z = z is a convex combination of simple sources. We classify the simple
sources by the functions f2, . . . , fq, and write
(X | Z = z, z) = ∑
f2,..., fq
c f2,..., fq,z(X1 | Z = z, f2(X1 | Z = z), . . . , fq(X1 | Z = z), z).
Hence, we can rewrite (X, Z) as a convex combination of conditionally simple sources.
(X, Z) =∑
z
Pr [Z = z] ∑
f2,..., fq
c f2,..., fq,z(X1 | Z = z, f2(X1 | Z = z), . . . , fq(X1 | Z = z), z)
= ∑
f2,..., fq
c′f2,..., fq∑
z
c′′f2,..., fq,z((X1 | Z = z, f2(X1 | Z = z), . . . , fq(X1 | Z = z)), z),
where c′f2,..., fq = ∑z c f2,..., fq,zPr [Z = z] and c
′′
f2,..., fq,z
=
c f2,..., fq ,z·Pr[Z=z]
c′f2,..., fq
.
Theorem 1 (Generalized Leftover Hash Lemma). Let h be a 2q-wise independent hash
function with input space D and output space R. Let f : R → S be any surjective function.
Let X = (X1, . . . , Xq) be a q-wise k-source with leakage Z where each Xi has support D, and
15
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Xi 6= Xj for i 6= j. Let U = (UR, . . . , UR). It holds for uniformly sampled seed S that
(S, f (h(S, X)), Z) ≈s,e (S, f (U), Z), (2.1)
where e = 12
√
2−k(|S|q − 1).
Proof. By Lemma 6, it suffices to prove Equation 2.1 for conditionally simple q-wise
k-sources, (X, Z). However, it will be convenient that we first prove this for the uncon-
ditional simple sources. Let X = (X1, g2(X1), . . . , gq(X1)) be a simple q-wise k-source.
We will show that
A = (S, f (h(S, X))) ≈s,e (S, f (U)) = B,
where e = 12
√|S|q2−k. Here, we follow the technique by [Zha16] and compute the
second order Re´nyi divergence between A and B.
RD2(A‖B) =∑
s,y
(Pr [S = s]Pr [ f (h(s, X)) = y])2
Pr [S = s]Pr [ f (U) = y]
=∑
y
∑s Pr [S = s]Pr [ f (h(s, X) = y]
2
Pr [ f (U) = y]
.
Notice that, for X1, X2
$← X.
∑
s
Pr [S = s]Pr [ f (h(s, X)) = y]2 = Pr [ f (h(S, X1)) = y = f (h(S, X2))] .
Also, by the universality and 2q-wise independence of h,
Pr [ f (U) = y] = Pr [h(S, X1) = y] .
16
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Hence, we rewrite
RD2(A‖B) =∑
y
Pr [ f (h(S, X1)) = y = f (h(S, X2))]
Pr [h(S, X2) = y]
=∑
y
Pr [ f (h(S, X1)) = y | Pr [ f (h(S, X2)) = y]]
= ∑
x1,x2
Pr [X = x1]Pr [X = x2]∑
y
Pr [ f (h(S, x1)) = y | f (h(S, x2)) = y] .
We look at two events separately. If x1 = x2, then
Pr [ f (h(S, x1)) = y | f (h(S, x2)) = y] = 1.
Hence,
∑
y
Pr [ f (h(S, x1)) = y | f (h(S, x2)) = y] = |S|q.
If x1 6= x2, since X is simple, x1 and x2 differ at every component. Hence, by 2q-wise
independence of h,
Pr [ f (h(S, x1)) = y | f (h(S, x2)) = y] = Pr [ f (h(S, x1)) = y] ,
and
∑
y
Pr [ f (h(S, x1)) = y | f (h(S, x2)) = y] = 1.
Finally, we have
RD2(A‖B) =∑
x
Pr [X = x] |S|q + ∑
x1 6=x2
Pr [X = x1]Pr [X = x2]
= CP(X)|S|q + (1−CP(X))
= 1+CP(X)(|S|q − 1).
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For the conditional case, i.e. (X, Z) is some conditionally simple q-wise k source. We
have that X | Z = z is a simple q-wise kz-source. Let Az = (S, f (h(S, X)), Z) | Z =
z, Bz = (S, f (U), Z) | Z = z. We compute that,
RD2((S, f (h(S, X)), Z)‖(S, f (U), Z)) = Ez[RD2(Az‖Bz)]
= Ez[1+CP(X | Z = z)(|S|q − 1)]
= 1+CP(X | Z)(|S|q − 1).
We obtain the bound claimed, for any conditionally simple q-wise k-source (X, Z),
using Lemma 4.
SD((S, f (h(S, X)), Z); (S, f (U), Z)) ≤
√
RD2((S, f (h(S, X)), Z)‖(S, f (U), Z))− 1
≤ 1
2
√
2−k(|S|q − 1).
Comparison with previous results Our bound, 12
√|S|q2−k, is tighter for the multi-
input case compared to the bound, 12
√
|S|qq22−k, obtained in [FOR15] which utilizes
a union bound. Our technical contribution is the definition of (conditionally) sim-
ple sources and showing that they are the extreme points for (conditional) q-wise
k-sources. However, we note that our version does not handle almost k-wise inde-
pendent hash function directly. Instead, if the statistical distance definition of being
almost k-wise independent is used, one can still use our result.
18
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2.3 Cryptographic Background
Cryptographic primitives and constructions are systems with states, inputs, and
outputs2. One way to formalize them is the framework of random systems [Mau02].
Formally speaking, a (X ,Y)-system, S, is a system with input space X and output
space Y . A system’s behavior is specified by a infinite list of conditional probability
distributions, PSYi|Xi,Yi−1 . In this thesis, all primitives and constructions of interest are
stateless. It is easy to see that such systems are convex combination of deterministic
systems. Such systems are call cc-stateless in the random systems literature. We will
refer to such systems as keyed systems.
A quick and efficient way to describe systems in a precise manner is using pseu-
docode. A randomized procedure taking input shall specify a random system in the
following manner: variable shall be shared between successive calls of the procedure,
and the return value shall be the output of the system. Cryptographic definitions and
reductions are also easily captured with pseudocode. In particular, we use the frame-
work of code-based game playing [BR08]. A game, G, is consists of procedures and
named oracles. The code shall always be specified in pseudocode. The entry point of
the game shall be implicitly the procedure “Main”. State between different oracles are
not shared. At the end, a game usually outputs a bit, G ⇒ b, b ∈ {0, 1}. In addition to
its brevity, it works naturally to the style of “hybrid” proofs. One can change part of
the pseudocode of game G to game G′. By carefully selecting the changed code, one
can bound the distance between games, |Pr [G ⇒ 1]− Pr [G ⇒ 0] |.
2While some system can be realized as a randomized Turing machine, not all systems need to be
efficient implementable using Turing machines.
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2.3.1 Computational Indistinguishability
We follow the standard definition in literature. A function, f (λ), is said to be
negligible if for any n ∈N there exists m ∈N such that f (λ) ≤ 1λn for all λ > m. Two
distribution ensembles, {Aλ}, {Bλ}, are said to be computationally indistinguishable
if for any polynomial time algorithm, D, the function
|Pr [D(Aλ)⇒ 1]− Pr [D(Bλ)⇒ 1]| ,
is negligible in λ (recall that D takes 1λ as an implicit input).
2.3.2 Hybrid Argument
The hybrid argument is a technique to bound the closeness of two distributions,
D0 and Dn, via a sequence of “hybrids”, D1, . . . , Dn. Two consecutive hybrids, Di and
Di+1, usually differ in one feature. Using the triangle inequality (for statistical distance
and computational distance), one then obtains a bound of the distance between D0 and
Dn by bounding the distance between Di and Di+1 for all i = 0, . . . , n− 1.
Statistical Hybrid Argument Suppose we have some joint distribution X = (X1, . . . , Xn)
with each Xi distributed on some set X . We would like to bound the distance of the
distribution, X , from uniform, U = (UX , . . . , UX ). Conventional hybrid method uti-
lizes bounds
SD(Xi; UX | X1, . . . , Xi−1) ≤ ei, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
to argue that
SD(X; U) ≤ e1 + . . . + en.
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Such method can be seen as bounding between the distance between n + 1 hybrids,
i.e.
(X1, . . . , Xn) = X
(UX , . . . , Xn)
...
(UX , . . . , UX ) = U.
For simplicity, suppose all n bounds are the same, say e. This method yield an overall
error of ne, which grows O(n) as n increases.
2.3.3 Blockciphers
Blockciphers, which are key-ed permutations, are widely used primitives in cryp-
tography. Practical constructions of blockciphers such as DES or AES consists of mul-
tiple rounds of simpler key-ed permutations. The round keys are, in general, derived
from the blockcipher key. The heuristics is that compositing different permutations
will make the construction appear more “random”, hence amplifying the security.
Random Permutation In this thesis, by a secure blockcipher we mean indistinguisha-
bility from a random permutation, under a uniformly random chosen key that is hid-
den from the adversary. Let A be any oracled randomized algorithm. Let RP denote
the random permutation, whose code is specified in Figure 2.1. Let P be any key-ed
permutation. We write AP to mean that we run A and offering it two sided oracle
(both forward and backward queries) access of P.
Security proofs of blockciphers are generally offered in two steps. First, one uses a
computational assumption to replace a underlying primitive with a information the-
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Proc RP[D](x) :
if T[x] = ⊥ then
T[x] $← D \ B
B = B ∪ {T[x]}
return T[x]
Figure 2.1: Pseudocode implementing RP[D], where D is the domain.
oretical counterpart. Second, the construction is proved secure assuming information
theoretical primitives. The classic example is the security proof of the Feistal construc-
tion assuming PRF security of the primitive [LR88].
Let S, T be two keyed permutations. We consider two types of distinguishers,
non-adaptive and adaptive distinguisher. A non-adaptive distinguisher is specified
by the set of query points. An adaptive distinguisher can adaptively select query
points based on the output of the cipher. Without loss of generality, we do not count
redundant queries by a distinguisher. By convention, we will use D to denote a non-
adaptive distinguisher and A to denote an adaptive one. Usually, we will also use q
to denote the number of queries a distinguisher makes.
Transcripts and Security of Blockcipehrs
We associate each interaction, e.g. DS, with a transcript of the form
τ =
(
(x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . , (xq, yq)
)
,
where we assume that without loss of generality the distinguisher makes no duplicate
queries. Now, we fix two systems, say S, U, where U is the ideal system (e.g. a PRP),
and a distinguisher D. We denote the set of potential transcripts (attainable with non-
zero probability) as T(DS) and T(DU) respectively. We now make the assumptions
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that T(DS) ⊆ T(DU)3. For each set of potential transcripts, T, we have a natural
probability assignment, PT(τ), assigning each transcript to the probability of attaining
it. We define the distinguishing advantage of D against two systems to be.
AdvdistS,U(D) := ‖PT(DS)(·)− PT(DU)(·)‖1,
Now, we recall the standard advantage of non-adaptively security of weak PRP and
adaptive security of strong PRP.
Adv
nprp
S (q) := maxnon-adaptive q-query D
AdvdistS,U(D),
Adv
±prp
S q := maxadaptive q-query A
AdvdistS,U(A).
3This will be true for our setting, and can always be made true by conditioning on some good event.
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Tighter Security Proofs Using Collision
Probability and Chi-Square Distance
Proofs using statistical distance is ubiquitous in cryptography. The main advantage
of statistical distance is two-fold. First, they are the statistical analog of the compu-
tational distance. Second, they satisfy data processing inequality and triangular in-
equality. In this chapter, we explores proof techniques using collision probability, CP,
and chi-squared distance,
χ(X; Y) :=
√
∑
ω∈Ω
(PX(ω)− PY(ω))2
PY(ω)
=
√
RD2(X‖Y)− 1.
3.1 Tighter Hybrid Argument
It was first observed by Chung and Vadhan [CV08] that the bound of statistical
distance (X1, . . . , Xn) to (U1, . . . , Un) only needs to grow
√
n larger than the individ-
ual distance between Xi and Ui. Their proof uses Hellinger distance and repetitive
applications of Holder’s inequality. Here, we prove a more general version via Re´nyi
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divergence. The main different is, in our Theorem 2, one can use component bound of
the form CP(Xi | X<i) ≤ 1+eM where M is the support size of Xi conditioned on some
given value of X<i (X<i denotes X1, . . . , Xi−1). This enables us to apply this result to
the case where the joint distribution describes a permutation, i.e. Xi 6= Xj for i ≤ j.
Theorem 2. Let X be some finite set. Let U = (U1, . . . , Un) be some uniform distribution,
where each component, Ui, is distributed over X . Let mi = maxx<i |Ui | U<i = x<i|. Let
X = (X1, . . . , Xn) be jointly distributed over the support of U. Suppose that CP(Xi | X<i) ≤
1+ei
mi
, for all i = 1, . . . , n. Then,
SD(X; U) ≤
√
ln(2)
2
n
∑
i=1
ei.
Before we offer the proof, let us look at two special cases of the Lemma. First,
let mi = |X | for all i. In this case, the Lemma captures the same result as [CV08].
Second, take mi = |X | − i, and that U represents the (possibly partial) function table
of a permutation. This case will be crucial for application to block ciphers. Third, if
we take ei = e for all i, our final bound is
√
ln(2)
2 ne, which is O(
√
n) with respect to n.
Proof (of Theorem 2). The key idea here is to bound the KL divergence, or the total
Shannon entropy deficiency, with bounds on collision probabilities. By Lemma 1 and
Corollary 1,
− log(CP(X | Y)) ≤ H2(X | Y) ≤ H1(X | Y).
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Proc EK,(X) :
for i = 0 to r do
X′ ← K[i]⊕ X; Xˆ ← max(X, X′)
if i(Xˆ) = 1 then X ← X′
return X
Figure 3.1: The Swap-or-Not Cipher, SN[N, r], which takes r rounds keys
K[1], . . . , K[r] and round functions 1,r.
Suppose that CP(Xi | X<i) ≤ 1+eimi . We compute
D1(X‖U) ≤ log(|(X1, . . . , Xn)|)− H1(X1, . . . , Xn) (Lemma 2)
≤
n
∑
i=1
log(mi)−
n
∑
i=1
H1(Xi | X<i)
≤
n
∑
i=1
log(mi) +
n
∑
i=1
log(CP(Xi | X<i))
≤
n
∑
i=1
log(mi) +
n
∑
i=1
log(
1+ ei
mi
)
≤
n
∑
i=1
log(1+ ei)
≤
n
∑
i=1
ei (log(1+ x) = x− x
2
2
+O(x3)).
Finally, by Pinsker’s inequality (Lemma 3),
SD(X; U) ≤
√
ln(2)
2
D1(X‖U) =
√
ln(2)
2
n
∑
i=1
ei.
3.1.1 Applications to Swap-Or-Not
The motivation for the swap-or-not construction (see Figure 3.1) was format-preserving
encryption [HMR12]. In format-preserving encryption, one assumes some group struc-
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of bounds of Swap-or-Not. The domain size is N = 264. The
plit “SN4” and “SN5” represents bounds of npca advantage of npca advantage of
npca advantage of npca advantage obtained in [HMR12] for SN[N, 4n] and SN[N, 5n],
respectively. “SN4’´’ represents the bound obtained in this work for SN[N, 4n]. One
can see the our bound saves at least one pass in this setting of parameters.
ture on the domain and some total ordering. The goal is to generate a key-ed permu-
tation on the domain that is indistinguishable from a random permutation with the
maximum amount of queries.
We use the Theorem 3 proved in [HMR12], together with Theorem 2 to prove the
following result.
Theorem 3.
Adv
nprp
SN[N,r](q) ≤
√
ln(2)
2
qN(
1
2
+
q
2N
)r/2.
We first observe the following identity.
Claim 1. Let X be a distribution over {0, 1}n. Then,
‖X−Ud‖22 = ‖X‖22 −
1
N
.
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Proof (of Claim 1). Compute that
‖X−Un‖22 = ‖X‖2 + ‖Un‖2 − 2〈X, Un〉
= ‖X‖2 − 1N .
Proof (of theorem 3). We re-write Equation (5) obtained in [HMR12] in our notation.
EXt,<i [‖Xt,i | Xt,<i −Ut,i‖22] = (
i + N
2N
)t.
We note that this translates to a bound of CP(Xt,i | Xt,<i) ≤ 1+(
i+N
2N )
t·Ni
Ni
via Claim 1.
We apply Theorem 2 to obtain the final bound.
Adv
ncpa
SN[N,r](q) ≤ SD(Xr, U)
≤
√√√√ ln(2)
2
q
∑
i=1
(
i + N
2N
)r · Ni
≤
√
ln(2)
2
qN(
1
2
+
q
2N
)r.
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3.2 Tighter Composition Theorem via Chi-Square Dis-
tance
3.2.1 Adaptive Versus Non-Adaptive Security
In the previous section, we proved tighter bound for non-adaptive security of
Swap-Or-Not.
One line of work [MPR07, CPS14, MP04] studies the security properties of block ci-
phers under composition assuming information theoretical secure rounds. In [HMR12],
the adaptive security of Swap-Or-Not is proved using the below theorem. Intuitively,
it says that, with double the rounds, you get adaptive security with essentially the
same parameters.
Theorem 4. [MPR07]
Adv
prp
S−1◦T(q) ≤ Adv
nprp
S−1 (q) + Adv
nprp
T (q).
Here, we offer evidence that working 2-norm related distances can improve such
a bound. In particular, we will define the Chi-Square distance. We fix some domain
X . Let S be a keyed permutation on X , and U = RP[X ]. Recall that, for some dis-
tinguisher D, we use T(DU) to denote the distribution of transcripts of an interaction
between D and U. We define
Adv
2nprp
S (q) := maxnon-adaptive q-query D
χ(T(DS); T(DU)),
Adv
2prp
S (q) := maxadaptive q-query A
χ(T(AS); T(AU)).
We prove a stronger version using the Chi-Square advantage.
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Theorem 5.
Adv
2prp
S◦T (q) ≤ Adv2nprpS−1 (q) · Adv
2nprp
T (q).
Proof. For any transcripts of the form,
τ =
(
(x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . , (xq, yq)
)
.
We consider the decomposition, τ = (x, y), where x consists of the q input values (could
be a result from a backward query), and y consists of q output values (could be the
input of a backward query). Notice that, for non-adaptive distinguishers, the proba-
bility of attaining x is specified by D and independent of y. We use T[x, y] to denote
the probability that T maps x to y. We let p∗ = 1
(M)q
be the probability mass of each
transcript in T(U). Notice that for any x, y, ∑z(T[x, z]− p∗) = ∑z(S[z, y]− p∗) = 0. If
we fix a deterministic q-query distinguisher A. Then, the set of potential transcript for
AU is of size M(M− 1) · · · (M− q+ 1) := (M)q, since conditioned on t queries, there
are always M− t + 1 possibilities for the next (x, y) regardless of the direction of the
queries. Hence, non-adaptive and adaptive q-query distinguisher will have potential
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transcripts of the same cardinality. We use T(U) to denote T(AU). We compute that,
Adv
2±prp
S−1◦T(q) =
√
|T(U)|∑
x,y
(S−1 ◦ T[x, y]−U[x, y])2
=
√√√√|T(U)|∑
x,y
(
∑
z
T[x, z] · S−1[z, y]− p∗
)2
=
√√√√|T(U)|∑
x,y
(
∑
z
(T[x, z]− p∗ + p∗) · (S−1[z, y]− p∗ + p∗)− p∗
)2
=
√√√√|T(U)|∑
x,y
(
∑
z
(T[x, z]− p∗) · (S−1[z, y]− p∗)
)2
≤
√√√√|T(U)|∑
x,y
(√
∑
z
(T[x, z]− p∗)2
√
∑
z
(S−1[z, y]− p∗)2
)2
≤
√√√√|T(U)|2 ·( 1√|T(U)| Adv2−nprpT (q) · 1√|T(U)| Adv2−nprpS−1 (q)
)2
≤ Adv2−nprpS−1 (q) · Adv
2−nprp
T (q).
3.2.2 Properties of Chi-Square Distinguishing Advantage
Behavior under Conditioning
Let X, Y, Z be random variables. For notational convenience, we define
χ(X, Y | Z) := χ((X, Z); (Y, Z)).
Unlike ‖ · ‖2, χ behaves well under conditioning.
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Lemma 7. If Z is independent of X, Y, then
χ(X, Y) = χ(X, Y | Z).
Proof.
χ(X, Y | Z) =
√
∑
a,b
(PX(a)PZ(b)− PY(a)PZ(b))2
PY(a)PZ(b)
=
√
∑
a,b
Z[b]
(PX(a)− PY(a))2
PY(a)
=
√
∑
a
(PX(a)− PY(a))2
PY(a)
(∑
b
PZ(b))
= χ(X, Y).
Double-Sided Point-Wise Proximity
In the section, we show how to bound χ using double-sided point-wise proximity.
Lemma 8. Let X be a random variable, and let U be the uniform over the same support. We
say that X satisfy (e, δ)-proximity if for all x,
(1− e) 1|U| ≤ Pr [X = x] ≤ (1+ δ)
1
|U| .
If X satisfy (e, δ)-proximity, then
χ(X, U) ≤
√
eδ.
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Proof. We rewrite χ in terms of variance, and apply Bhatia–Davis inequality [BD00].
χ(X, U) =
√
|U|(∑
ω
PX(ω(2− 1|U| )
=
√
|U|2(∑
ω
1
|U|PX(ω)
2 − (∑
ω
1
|U|PX(ω))
2
=
√
|U|2Var[PX(U)]
≤
√
|U|2(max
x
Pr [X = x]− 1|U| )(
1
|U| −minx Pr [X = x])
≤
√
|U|2e 1|U|δ
1
|U|
≤
√
eδ.
3.2.3 Potential Application to Swap-Or-Not
To apply our new composition theorem to Swap-Or-Not, we need a bound on
Adv2nprp. In our previous setup of notation, it amounts to bounding
χ(Xt, U).
However, the technique from [HMR12] and [Tes14] does not apply directly to χ. The
main difficulty is that χ does not satisfy triangle inequality and one cannot apply the
hybrid technique. We leave it as an open problem.
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Leftover Hash Lemma for Joint Leakage
The classical leftover hash lemma [HILL99] has seen wide usage in cryptography, es-
pecially in leakage resilient cryptography. Here, inspired by the Universal Computa-
tional Extractors assumption [BHK13], we derive a variant of Leftover Hash Lemma
for joint leakage.
4.1 Preliminaries
4.1.1 Universal Computational Extractors
Universal Computational Extractor (UCE), is a security assumption on hash func-
tions, captured by the security game in Figure 4.1. Let
AdvUCEH,S ,A(λ) := 2Pr [UCE[H,S ,A]⇒ 1]− 1.
With slight abuse of notation, we say that H ∈ UCE[S ] if AdvUCEH,S ,A is negligible for all
efficient A.
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Game UCE[H,S ,A]
b $← {0, 1}
hk
$← H.Gen()
z $← SHash[hk,b]()
b′ $← D(hk, z)
return (b = b′)
Proc Hash[hk, b](x) :
if T[x] = ⊥ then
if b = 0 then
T[x]← Hhk(x)
else
T[x] $← {0, 1}H.ol
return T[x]
Figure 4.1: Game defining UCE security for a hash family H, source S , and distinguisher D.
UCE Sources A UCE source, S , is different compared to a source specified in Sec-
tion. A UCE source, S , is a randomized oracle algorithm, taking exactly one oracle,
Hash. S shall make some queries to Hash before returning some leakage. UCE is a class
of assumptions. For certain UCE sources, the notion is not achievable. For instance,
the UCE source, S could leak the query point, x, along with the hash value y = H(x).
Then, with all by 12n probability, an adversary can predict b in the UCE game by check-
ing if H(x) = y. The study of UCE involves exploring the feasibility, construction, and
applications of UCE for different class of sources. Several interesting restrictions of
sources has been studied.
Split UCE Sources A split UCE source S = splt[S0,S1] is one that is generated in
two stages. First, S0 generates a list of input points x with leakage L0. Then, the
hash values y = Hash(x) is given to S1, producing leakage L1. The overall leakage is
L = (L0, L1). The pseudocode of splt[S0,S1] is given in Figure 4.2. The class of split
sources is denoted Ssplt.
Statistical Unpredictable UCE Sources A UCE source, S is statistically unpredictable
if the query points x of S is statistically unpredictable given the output of S . More
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Source splt[S0,S1]Hash :
(L0, x)← S0()
for i = 0, . . . , |x| do
y[i]← Hash(x[i])
L1
$← S1(y)
L← (L0, L1)
return L
Figure 4.2: Pseudocode defining the split source S = splt[S0,S1].
concretely, for L $← S(1λ) and x be the query points of S , we require
H∞(x | L)
to be a negligible function of λ. The class of statistically unpredictable sources is de-
noted Ssup.
Other conventions We can also classify UCE sources by the number of distinct queries
that it makes to the hash function. We use Sq to denote the class of sources making
exactly q distinct queries.
Connections to Extractors
By construction, the assumption UCE[S1,Ssplt,Ssup] is essentially requiring a fam-
ily of hash function to be “extractors”.
4.2 Leftover Hash Lemma for Joint Leakage
Let us look up the assumption without the Ssplt requirement, i.e. UCE[S1,Ssup]. We
name this case “joint leakage”, for the leakage depends on both the input and output
to the hash function. Since there is only one query, we let the query point be x. Let u
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be uniform in the output space of Hash. Then, the assumption UCE[S1,Ssup] translates
to,
(s, L(x, hs(x))) ≈c (s, L(x, u)).
We now prove that universal hash functions is UCE[S1,Ssup] for appropriate parame-
ters.
Theorem 6 (Leftover Hash Lemma for Joint Leakge). Let k = H∞(x | L(x, u)). Let h be
an universal hash function with output length m. Let u be uniform in the output space of h.
Let s be a uniform random seed for h. Then,
(s, L(x, u)) ≈s,e (s, L(x, hs(u))),
where e = 12
√
24m−k.
Proof. By Lemma 5,
H∞(x | L(x, u), u) ≥ k−m.
Notice that since s is independent from x. Let u′ be an i.i.d copy of u. By the Leftover
Hash Lemma (Lemma 1),
(s, L(x, u), u, hs(x)) ≈s,e (s, L(x, u), u, u′), (4.1)
where
e =
1
2
√
2m−(k−m) = 1
2
√
22m−k.
Let A, B be the two distribution on left and right side of Equation 4.1, respectively. Let
Ω be the sample space of A and B. Note that Ω consists of a 4-tuples. Define event
E ⊆ Ω to be event where the third and fourth component collide, i.e. E = {(a, b, c, d) ∈
Ω | c = d}. Since u is uniform and independent of h(x), Pr [A ∈ E] = 12m . Since u is
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uniform and independent of u′, Pr [B ∈ E] = 12m . By Lemma 9, we conclude that
A | E ≈s,e′ B | E,
where
e′ = 2m 1
2
√
22m−k = 1
2
√
24m−k.
Lemma 9. Let A, B be two distributions overΩ. Let E ⊆ Ω be an event such that Pr [A ∈ E] =
Pr [B ∈ E] = p. Then,
SD(A | E; B | E) ≤ SD(A; B)
p
.
Proof. It is easily obtained by expanding the definition of statistical distance.
SD(A | E; B | E) = 1
2 ∑
ω∈E
∣∣∣∣PA(ω)PA(E) − PB(ω)PB(E)
∣∣∣∣
=
1
p
· 1
2 ∑
ω∈E
|PA(ω)− PB(ω)|
≤ 1
p
SD(A; B).
4.3 Construction of UCE[S q∩Ssup]with Constant Output
Length
In this section, we extend the result obtain from the previous section to multiple
queries. This amounts to extending the joint-leakage LHL to 2q-wise independent
hash functions.
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Theorem 7 (Leftover Hash Lemma for Joint Leakge). Let h be a 2q-wise independent
hash function. Let u be q independently uniform samples from the output space of h. Let s be a
uniform random seed for h. Let x be q-ary distribution over the input space of h. Suppose that
H∞(x | L(x, u)) ≥ k. Then,
(s, L(x, u)) ≈s,e (s, L(x, hs(x))),
where e = 12
√
24qm−k.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 6, hence we will be brief here.
By Lemma 5, we have that H∞(x | L(x, u), u) ≥ k− qm. We claim that,
(s, L(x, u), u, hs(x)) ≈s,e (s, L(x, u), u, u′), (4.2)
with e = 12
√
2k−2qm. This follows by computing that CP(hs(x) | s, L(x, u), u) =
1+2k−2qm
2qm , which follows from the 2q-wise independence of h. Lastly, we use 9 on the
event E = {(a, b, c, d) ∈ Ω | c = d}, where Ω is the sample space both distribution in
Equation 4.2, to conclude the theorem.
4.4 Construction of UCE[S q ∩ Ssup ∩ S splt] with Polyno-
mial Output Length
In this section, we attempt the construct multiple query UCE without compromis-
ing on the output length.
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4.4.1 Extreme Lossy Functions (ELF)
Definition 9. An extremely lossy function, ELF, consists of an algorithm ELF.Gen. ELF.Gen
takes in two parameter M (with log(M) implicitly being the security parameter) and r ∈ [M],
and outputs a description of a function f : [M]→ [N], such that
• f is efficiently computable (in log(M)).
• If r = M, then f is injective with overwhelming probability.
• If r < M, then | f ([M])| ≤ r with overwhelming probability.
• For any polynomial p and non-negligible e, there exists a polynomial q such that the
following holds: any adversary running at most time p has less than e advantage in
distinguishing ELF.Gen(M, M) from ELF.Gen(M, r) for any r ≥ q(log(M)).
4.4.2 Our construction
Let h be an 2q-wise independent function with output space [M] and seed length
d1. Let h′ be an universal hash function with seed length d2 and output length 12 log(M).
Let f be an ELF with input domain [M]. Consider the hash function construction in
Figure 4.3.
Theorem 8. Let S be a q-query split source with statistical unpredictability k. If q ∈
O(k/ log(λ)), the construction H1[q] is a secure UCE[S ] hash function.
Proof. The proof proceeds by using hybrids, which are parameterized by r that will
by specified later. The following games will be based off of the UCE game, except
that the games will return b′, the value returned by D. Notice that, in this setup,
Pr [G0 ⇒ 1]− Pr [G4 ⇒ 1] is upper-bounded by the UCE advantage.
• G0 is the UCE game with the hash function, i.e. b = 0 in game UCE[H1[q],S ,D].
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Proc H1[q].KG() :
f $← ELF.Gen(M, M)
s1
$← {0, 1}d1
s2
$← {0, 1}d2
return (fk, s)
Proc H1[q](hk, x) :
return h′s2( f (hs1(x)))
Figure 4.3: Construction H1[q]. h is a 2q-wise independent hash function, h′ is a
universal hash function.
• G1, we switch f to be lossy in the underlying construction of H1[q], i.e. f $←
ELF.Gen(M, r).
• G2, we replace the q inputs to f to be uniformly chosen in the input space of f .
• G3, we switch f back to be injective in H1[q], i.e. f $← ELF.Gen(M, M).
• G4 is the UCE game with RO, i.e. b = 1 in the game UCE[H1[q],S ,D].
Suppose towards a contradiction that a distinguisher D, with running time tD,
together with source S , with running time tS , has non-negligible advantage e in win-
ning the UCE game. We will reach contradiction by bounding the advantage through
our sequence of hybrids above. Let t = poly(tD, tS) to be the maximum running time
of all five games G0, . . . , G4. Let e′ = e/3. By the ELF security, we can pick some
r ∈ poly(λ) such that games G0, G1 and G2, G3 are close, i.e.
Pr [G0 ⇒ 1]− Pr [G1 ⇒ 1] < e′, (4.3)
Pr [G2 ⇒ 1]− Pr [G3 ⇒ 1] < e′. (4.4)
41
Leftover Hash Lemma for Joint Leakage Chapter 4
It remains to bound the distance between G1, G2 and G3, G4. We observe that the
distance between G1 and G2 can be bounded using the Generalized Leftover Hash
Lemma 1, since f is independently chosen here.
Pr [G1 ⇒ 1]− Pr [G2 ⇒ 1] ≤ SD((s, z, f (hs(x))); (s, z, f (u)) ≤
√
rq
2k
.
This advantage is negligible for polynomial r as long as k− c · q log(λ) ∈ ω(log(λ)).
Which is achievable as long as klog(λ) ∈ ω(q). Observe that, in G3, inputs to h2 are in-
dependently random. Hence, we can simply apply the standard leftover hash lemma
to obtain
Pr [G3 ⇒ 1]− Pr [G4 ⇒ 1] ≤ SD((s, z, h′( f (u))); (s, z, u)) ≤ 2−
log(M)
4 .
Now, we have that the UCE advantage of A is bounded by
Pr [G0 ⇒ 1]− Pr [G4 ⇒ 1] ≤ 2e3 +
√
rq
2k
+ 2− log(M)/4,
which is asymptotically smaller than e. Hence, we reach a contradiction and H1[q]
must be UCE[S ] secure.
4.5 Construction of UCE[S q∩Ssup] with Polynomial Out-
put Length
To prove security against non-split sources, the main difficulty is dealing with joint
leakage. We will use the same sequence of hybrid. The proof differ in bounding the
distance of G2 and G1. To obtain the new bound, we observe the following variant of
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leftover hash lemma.
Lemma 10 (Crooked Leftover Hash Lemma for Joint Leakage). Let h be a 2q-wise inde-
pendent function with input space [N]. Let X be some distribution over ([N])q and let U be
uniform over ([N])q. Let L be an arbitrary function such that H∞(X | L(X, U)) ≥ k. Let r
be the bound on the image size of f . Then,
SD(s, L(X, f (U)); s, L(X, f (hs(X)))) ≤ (r + r
2
1− re )e,
where e = 12
√
rq
2k . In particular, when r is polynomial (in the security parameter), the distance
is negligible.
Proof. First we observe that since s is independently picked, H∞(X | s, L(X, f (u))) ≥
k. By the leakage lemma, H∞(X | s, L(X, f (u)), f (u)) ≥ k−m. Hence,
s, L(X, f (u)), f (u), f (h(x)) ≈s,e s, L(X, f (u)), f (u), f (u′)
We define the event E to be the event that the third component collides with the fourth
component. The right distribution admits event E with probability CP( f (u)) ≥ 1r . The
left distribution admits event E with probability within CP( f (u))± e. Observe that
we need to compute SD(A | E; B | E). The result follows from the lemma below and
the Generalized Leftover Hash Lemma 1.
Lemma 11 (Closeness Under Conditioning). Let A, B be two distribution over Ω. Let
E ⊂ Ω be an event. Suppose that Pr [B ∈ E] ≥ p ≥ SD(A; B), then
SD(A | E; B | E) ≤ ( 1
p
+
1
p(p− e) )SD(A; B).
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Proof. Let e = SD(A; B). Compute that
SD(A | E; B | E) = ∑
ω∈E
PA|E(ω)>PB|E(ω)
PA(ω)
Pr [A ∈ E] −
PB(ω)
Pr [B ∈ E]
≤ ∑
ω∈E
PA|E(ω)>PB|E(ω)
PA(ω)
Pr [B ∈ E]− e −
PB(ω)
Pr [B ∈ E]
= ∑
ω∈E
PA|E(ω)>PB|E(ω)
PA(ω)
Pr [B ∈ E]
Pr [B ∈ E]
Pr [B ∈ E]− e −
PB(ω)
Pr [B ∈ E]
= ∑
ω∈E
PA|E(ω)>PB|E(ω)
PA(ω)
Pr [B ∈ E] (1+
e
Pr [B ∈ E]− e )−
PB(ω)
Pr [B ∈ E]
= ∑
ω∈E
PA|E(ω)>PB|E(ω)
PA(ω)
Pr [B ∈ E] (1+
e
p− e )−
PB(ω)
Pr [B ∈ E]
≤ e
Pr [B ∈ E] +
Pr [A ∈ E]
Pr [B ∈ E] ·
e
p− e
≤ e
p
+
e
p(p− e) .
We now prove the following theorem, for the same construction H1[q].
Theorem 9. Let S be a q-query UCE source with statistical unpredictability k. If q ∈
O(k/ log(λ)), the construction H1[q] is a secure UCE[S ] hash function.
Proof. We use the same four hybrids. Notice that the only difference with considering
non-split sources is the difference between G1 and G2. By Lemma 10, we need
(r +
r2
1− r
√
rq2−k
)
√
rq2−k (4.5)
be to negligible, where r is not polynomial in λ. Suppose that q ∈ O(k/ log(λ)). Then,
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rq2−k is negligible. Hence, 1− r
√
rq2−k is negligibly close to 1. Finally, we conclude
that 4.5 is negligible. This, with the rest of the proof of Theorem 8, concludes the proof
of Theorem 9.
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Chapter 5
Unified Lossy Primitive: Lossy
Deterministic Encryption
5.1 Preliminaries
Sources Inspired by recent works [BHK13, BS16], we offer a parameterized secu-
rity definitions based on distributions. A source, D, is a (potentially) inefficient ran-
domized algorithm, taking an input q, and generates q output points together with
leakage z. In this thesis, we will restrict to block-sources. D is a 1-block-source with
min-entropy k if for (x1, . . . , xq)
$← D(q), H∞(xi | x<i) ≥ k for all 0 ≤ i ≤ q.
5.2 Survey of Existing Results
5.2.1 Lossy Trapdoor Functions
A Lossy Trapdoor family of function is a family of trapdoor functions with two
modes of key generation. Formally, it consists of three algorithms (KG, Eval, Inv).
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• In injective mode, KG(0) generates (pk, sk) with pk being the public evaluation
key and sk being the secret trapdoor. We require that Inv(sk, Eval(pk, ·)) to be
the identity function.
• In lossy mode, KG(1) generates (lk,⊥), with lk being the public evaluation key
and no trapdoors. Additionally, Eval(lk, ·) should have image size at most 2n−k.
• Furthermore, injective keys and lossy keys are computationally indistinguish-
able, i.e.
{pk : pk $← KG(0)} ≈c {lk : lk $← KG(, 1)}.
5.2.2 Deterministic Encryption
A deterministic encryption scheme is a public-key encryption scheme that is de-
terministic. However, with the absence of encryption randomness, schemes cannot
achieve the standard IND-CPA security anymore. In literature, handful of definitions
are proposed, and they turn out to be equivalent. Below we present the PRIV security
[BFOR08].
An deterministic encryption scheme DE = (KG, Enc, Dec) is said to be PRIV[D]-
secure if the advantage, Pr [GPRIV[DE,D,A]⇒ 1], is negligible in λ for any efficient
A.
Notice that hereD generates a q outputs, each with two component. The two com-
ponent could be arbitrarily correlated. We will construct DE that is PRIV[D]-security
for 1-block-source D.
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Game GPRIV[DE,D,A]():
b $← {0, 1}
((x0, x1), z)
$← D(q)
pk
$← DE.KG
c = DE.Enc(pk, xb)
b′ $← A(c, z)
return (b = b′)
Figure 5.1: Game defining the PRIV security of DE.
5.2.3 Lossy Encryption
Similar to LTDFs, Lossy Encryption also has two modes. However, the lossiness
property implies something different about the encryption. Formally, a Lossy Encryp-
tion scheme is a collection of three algorithm (KG, Enc, Dec) that has the following
properties.
• In injective mode, KG(0) generates (pk, sk). We require that Dec(sk, Enc(pk, m)) =
m for all m in the message space.
• In lossy mode, KG(1) generates (lk,⊥), and Eval(lk, ·) defines a function whose
image size is at most 2n−k.
• We require that the two modes are indistinguishable, i.e
{pk : pk $← KG(0)} ≈c {lk : lk $← KG(1)}.
• We require that under the encryption randomness (r sampled uniformly ran-
domly), the ciphertext of any two plaintext, x, x′, are statistically close, i.e. it
48
Unified Lossy Primitive: Lossy Deterministic Encryption Chapter 5
Proc LE.KG():
(fpk, fsk) $← LT.KG()
hk
$← {0, 1}d
pk← (fpk, hk)
sk← (fsk, hk)
return (pk, sk)
Proc LE.Enc(pk, m, r):
(fk, hk)← pk
c1 ← F(fk, r)
c2 ← m⊕ hhk(r)
return (c1, c2)
Proc LE.Dec(sk, c):
(fsk, hk)← sk
(c1, c2)← c
r ← LT.Inv(fsk, c1)
m← h(r)⊕ c2
return m
Figure 5.2: Construction of Lossy Encryption: LE[LT]. h is a universal hash function
with seed length d and output length m. [BHY09]
Proc DE.KG():
(fpk, fsk) $← LT.KG(0)
(ppk, ssk) $← PKE.KG()
hk
$← {0, 1}d
pk← (fpk, ppk, hk)
sk← (fsk, ssk, hk)
return (pk, sk)
Proc DE.Enc(pk, m):
(fpk, ppk, hk)← pk
y = LT.Eval(fpk, m)
r = h(hk, m)
c← PKE.Enc(ppk, y, r)
return c
Proc DE.Dec(sk, c):
(fsk, ssk, hk)← sk
c′ ← PKE.Dec(ssk, c)
m← LT.Inv(fsk, c′)
return m
Figure 5.3: The Encrypt-with-Hardcore Construction of Deterministic Encryption,
DE[PKE]. PKE is a regular public-key encryption scheme. h is a universal hash func-
tion with seed length d and output length equal to the length of randomness of PKE
holds with negligible e that
Enc(lk, x, r) ≈s,e Enc(lk, x′, r).
5.2.4 Constructions Using LTDF
LTDF has been used to construct Deterministic Encryption and Lossy encryption.
One common method is to use a hardcore for LTDF to achieve security in Lossy and
Deterministic Encryption. We highlight two existing constructions known in literature
in Figure 5.2.4 and 5.2.4.
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5.3 Unifying Definition: Lossy Deterministic Encryption
We show that a statistically-lossy version of Deterministic Encryption unifies the
definition of deterministic encryption, lossy encryption, and hedged encryption.
Definition 10. Let D be a source, e : N → R be a function. We say that an encryption
scheme LDE = (KG, Enc, Dec) is a (D, e)-Lossy Deterministic Encryption if the following
holds.
• The following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable.
{pk : pk $← KG(0)} ≈c {lk : lk $← KG(1)}.
• Let l some polynomial of security parameter λ. For any m0, . . . , ml $← D(l), it holds
with overwhelming probability (over sampling lk $← KG(1)) that
Enclk(m1), . . . , Enclk(ml) ≈s,e(l) Enclk(u1), . . . , Enclk(ul),
where u1, . . . , ul are independently uniformly random messages over the plaintext space.
In this thesis, we focus on 1-block-sourceD. IfD is a 1-block-source and an encryption scheme
is (D, e)-LDE, then we have e(n) ≤ ne(1). Hence, alternatively, we write (k, e)-LDE to
mean (D, ne) for a 1-block-source D with component-wise entropy k.
5.3.1 Unifying Construction from LTDFs
It is known that construction of LTDF from DDH and LWE are already determinis-
tic encryptions schemes, since the LTDF is a strong extractor under the randomness of
lk. However, constructions of LTDF from QR, DCR are not directly extracting [Wee12].
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Proc ELT.KG(b):
fk
$← LT.KG(b)
hk
$← {0, 1}d
return (fk, hk)
Proc ELT.pk(m):
(fk, hk)← pk
return Ffk(Hhk(m))
Proc ELT−1pk (c):
m← H−1hk (F−1fk (c))
return m
Figure 5.4: Construction of Extracting LTDF
Proc LDE.KG(b):
(pk, sk) $← ELT.KG(b)
return (pk, sk)
Proc LDE.Encpk(m, r):
return Fpk(r)
Proc LDE.Decpk(c):
m← [(F−1pk (c)]l1
return m
Figure 5.5: Construction of Lossy Deterministic Encryption from any Extracting LTDF.
Definition 11 (Extracting LTDF). A LTDF, LT, is (k′, e)-extracting if for (pk,⊥) $← LT.KG(1),
and for any distribution of messages, X over the input spaceM, such that H∞(X) ≥ k′, we
have that
LT.Eval(pk, X) ≈s,e LT.Eval(pk, UM).
Extracting LTDF from any LTDF We note that the Generalized Leftover Hash Lemma
(Theorem 1) gives rise to an extracting LTDF. Let H be a pairwise independent permu-
tation over {0, 1}n with seed length d, and let F be a (n, k)-LTDF, whose lossy image
size is at most 2n−k. The construction in Figure 5.3.1 is an (k′,
√
2n−k−k′)-extracting
(n, k)-LTDF.
Lossy Deterministic Encryption from Extracting LTDFs Assuming an extracting
LTDF, we use the pad-and-deterministic (PtD) technique [BBN+09]. Let F be an (k′, e)-
extracting (n, k)-LTDF. Then the below construction is a secure (k′, e)-lossy determin-
istic encryption scheme.
51
Unified Lossy Primitive: Lossy Deterministic Encryption Chapter 5
Message length Randomness length
EwH n− k− 2 log(1/e) n
Construction from LDE n− k− 2 log(1/e) k + 2 log(1/e)
Table 5.1: Table comparing EwH and LE from LDE, using the same (n, k)-LTDF.
Comparision of Parameters Table 5.3.1 compares Encryption-with-Hardcore (EwH)
and the construction from LDE, using the same (n, k)-lossy trapdoor family. Construc-
tion of LE from LDE uses less randomness to encrypt the same message space with
the same closeness parameter e.
5.4 Equivalence of Lossy Deterministic Encryption and
Lossy Trapdoor Functions
In [HO13], it was observed that Lossy Encryption implies LTDF if the length of the
randomness is shorter than the message length. In particular, it was shown that, with
overwhelming probability, the function LE.Enc(lk, ·, hs(·)) is lossy. This result leaves
open the question of whether there is an equivalence between all aforementioned lossy
primitives.
In the non-lossy case, we know that there does not exists black-box construction
of Trapdoor functions from Public-Key Encryption schemes [GMR01]. Hence, finding
such an equivalence in the statistical case is interesting since we know such equiva-
lence does not hold in the computational case.
Unlike Lossy Encryption, Lossy Deterministic Encryption has a distributional as-
sumption that is stronger. The intuition here is that the Lossy Deterministic Encryp-
tion assumption is strong enough to directly imply LTDF. We present a simple lemma
to support our claim.
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Lemma 12. Let f : M → N be any function. Suppose that |M| = 2n. Suppose that
for any distribution, X, on M, such that H∞(X) ≥ k, we have f (X) ≈s,e f (UM). Then,
| f (U)| ≤ (2k−n + e) · |M|, i.e. f is (n, log(2k−n + e)n)-lossy.
Proof. Pick a flat distribution, X, with minimum entropy k (uniform over 2k elements).
Notice that | f (X)| ≤ 2k. By hypothesis, we have that f (X) ≈s,e f (UM). Define B =
{ω ∈ N | Pr [ f (X) = ω] < Pr [ f (UM) = ω]}. Notice that | f (UM)| ≤ | f (X)| + |B|
and that ∑ω∈B Pr [ f (UM) = ω]− Pr [ f (X) = ω] ≤ e. We compute,
e ≥ ∑
ω∈B
Pr [ f (UM) = ω]− Pr [ f (X) = ω]
≥ ∑
ω∈B
Pr [ f (UM) = ω]
≥ Pr
[
UM ∈ f−1(B)
]
.
Hence, |B| ≤ | f−1(B)| ≤ |M|e, since UM is uniform. Hence, | f (UM)| ≤ | f (K)|+ B ≤
2k + e2n = (2k−n + e)|M|.
Observe that LDE and LTDF differs only in how “lossiness” is defined. Using the
above lemma to relate the two notions of lossiness, the following theorem follows
naturally.
Theorem 10. Any Lossy Deterministic Encryption Scheme with message length n, that is
secure for messages with min-entropy at least k and closeness e, is also a (n, log(2k−n + e)n)-
Lossy Trapdoor Function.
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